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 A Question of Leadership, “Read my Lips: No New Taxes.” 
 
 
Immediately after the speech, I knew it was good.... There is a definite sea change and 
it’s something fantastic.        George H. W. Bush 21 August 19881
 
So I made a mistake…. I knew at the time I was going to take a lot of political flack. I 
knew we’d have someone out there yelling “read my lips”, and I did it because I thought 
it was right. And I made a mistake.   George H. W. Bush 19 
October19922
 
 
 
George H. W. Bush’s tax pledge to the 1988 Republican convention played a crucial role 
in winning the White House but subsequently resulted in a loss of credibility that 
undermined his presidency. This paper examines the consequences of the ‘no new taxes’ 
pledge from when it was first made in the New Hampshire primary election in January 
1989 until the summer of June 1990 when George H. W. Bush (Bush) was compelled to 
renege on his promise in order to secure a budget agreement with Congress. By the end 
of his presidency, the tax pledge had become a metaphor for a failed economic policy. 
But in 1988, the promise re-launched a campaign that had been in deep trouble. After 
making the tax pledge the Bush campaign recovered momentum. The election was won 
by a landslide.  Four years later, Bush recognised that a serious mistake had been made 
and acknowledged that his re-election prospects had been diminished by the breaking of 
the promise and the loss of credibility.  
 
The paper sets out to consider the political and economic implications of the tax pledge 
and assess Bush’s leadership and skill in dealing with the issue. Firstly, it examines the 
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successful 1988 presidential campaign and how the tax pledge was skilfully exploited to 
turn the campaign around and win the election. The paper will consider the pivotal role 
played by the acceptance speech, the extent of Bush’s involvement in the drafting and the 
background to the making of the unequivocal commitment on taxes. Secondly, the paper 
will investigate the circumstances surrounding the breaking of the promise and the raising 
of taxes. President Bush’s commitment to supply side theories and how prevailing 
economic conditions influenced the change in policy will also be examined.  The Reagan 
legacy and the reasons why the budget deficit presented such an intractable problem for 
the Bush administration will be reviewed. Finally, the consequences of the tax pledge and 
implications for Bush’s presidential leadership will be considered.  
 
Identity Problem 
 
At the start of his campaign Bush had an identity problem. Throughout his political 
career, the character question dogged Bush, who had gained a reputation for expediency 
rather than principle. When Bush announced his candidacy in 1987, press reaction was 
negative. A Newsweek cover appeared entitled ‘Fighting the Wimp Factor’3 which 
brought the character question back into public debate. Time magazine weighed in with a 
cover entitled, ‘Is this a Wimp?’4  The New York Times accused Bush of “never giving 
his handlers a sense of direction … [he] still did not know who he was or where he 
wanted to go.”5 It was claimed that on cultural and moral issues Bush adjusted positions 
to suit public opinion.6 The Washington Post criticised the inconsistency of Bush’s 
political stances.7 Even former President Nixon felt it necessary to write to Bush and 
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counsel him that he would have to be his own man if he ever hoped to win the 
presidency.8  
 
Excessive loyalty and deference to Reagan raised questions about Bush’s own 
convictions and his ability to lead. Indeed Reagan himself had questioned his ‘spunk’ and 
had been reluctant to place him on the ticket in 1980.9 Regarded as prone to waffle and a 
lightweight, Bush was considered a potential liability. Further, the attempt by Bush to 
position himself as everyman,10 while his family and social connections seemed confined 
to the richest strata of American society, lacked conviction. Deeply offended by the 
criticism and the wimp label, Bush resolved to fight back. 
 
The promise not to raise taxes was first introduced in New Hampshire in January 1988.11 
In the Iowa primary Bush, garnering just 19 % of the vote, had been stunned by a poor 
third place showing behind Bob Dole (37%) and the evangelist Pat Robertson (25%). 
This was seen as a crushing defeat for a sitting vice-president. Again running behind 
Dole in the New Hampshire polls, a hard hitting TV commercial was produced.  The ‘we 
won’t raise taxes’ commercial ran eighteen times during the last three days of the primary 
and was targeted directly at Dole’s straddling of the issue.12 The TV ad took much of the 
credit for turning the faltering primary campaign around and the theme was incorporated 
into the national campaign. Research showed that the unambiguous stance on taxes made 
Bush look strong and decisive.  
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Wedge Issues 
 
After the primaries, it was clear that Bush would be the Republican nominee but his 
campaign had difficulty gaining traction. When Michael Dukakis was nominated as the 
Democratic candidate, Bush fell behind by 17 percentage points in the polls.13 It was 
evident that Reagan Democrats, those that had voted Republican at the two previous 
presidential elections, were defecting in large numbers. Polls showed that about third 
were in the process of sliding back to their old party.14 It became evident that relying on 
Reagan’s popularity would not win the election. In order to re-launch his campaign, Bush 
turned to an old colleague James Baker: the man who had masterminded his failed 1970 
senate campaign. Baker left his job as Treasury Secretary to put his, “best friend behind 
the desk.”15  In July, the two men went on fishing trip to Wyoming and discussed the 
forthcoming campaign. It was agreed that a more aggressive stance was essential: one 
which would lay the wimp factor to rest. Baker was committed to making the Bush 
candidacy synonymous with a Reagan third term.16  A difficult task for, as Fred 
Greenstein points out, “Bush was the near antithesis of his predecessor.”17  
 
Baker realised that momentum had to be restored before the convention in New Orleans. 
After months of drift, Baker gave a new sense of direction.18 He recognised that the 
campaign needed to be proactive in the way it communicated and that new priorities were 
required.19 Bush would ‘firmly embrace’ the Reagan vision of smaller government 
through lower taxes and the empowerment of local communities. By promising not to 
raise taxes, the party faithful would be reassured about the commitment to smaller 
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government. Throughout the campaign, it was considered important that Bush 
“spotlighted his differences” [author’s italics] with the Democratic candidate.20  Despite 
denials, the strategy was to ‘go negative’ and use the tax issue to gain the initiative. 
 
The task of Roger Ailes and Lee Atwater was to ensure the effectiveness of the message 
and they were given considerable freedom of action.21 Ailes had played an important role 
in securing Nixon’s election in 1968 and had literally written the book on image building 
and aggressive campaigning.22 The goal was to turn Bush “from a wimp into a tough but 
caring leader,”23 by repositioning him as a self-made Texan who had ‘abandoned’ his 
privileged New England connections in order to move south to build a new life for his 
family. Surprisingly, the prototype for the tough but caring image was the movie actor 
Clint Eastwood. Darman sardonically wrote that although, “Clint Eastwood was not on 
the ticket,” it was intended that Bush should exude, “Eastwood’s power, directness and 
absolute firmness.”24 In the convention acceptance speech, the tough, no-nonsense 
attitude of, ‘make my day’ was to morph into the equally uncompromising, ‘read my lips: 
no new taxes’.25  
 
During the campaign, there would be a high road and a low road. Bush remained above 
the fray while Atwater and Ailes aggressively attacked the integrity of Dukakis.26 A bare 
knuckled campaign had the bonus of burying the wimp accusations. Policy discussion 
and explanation were avoided whenever possible. A single minded attack on Dukakis 
was the main focus. Responding to criticism, Baker denied that the strategy was to go 
negative but rather that it was a legitimate attempt to highlight “factual contrasts”27 
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[author’s italics]. Democrats maintained that the intention was to exploit wedge issues:28 
twisting divisive issues to get a negative visceral response from the electorate. Parmet 
claimed the Bush campaign engaged in, “the most slashing presidential campaign attacks 
since Harry Truman,”29 while Hargrove argued that this strategy diminished the political 
process, “with slogans rather than ideas or policies.”30
 
Focus groups were employed to hone the attacks on the Dukakis record as Governor of 
Massachusetts.31 Atwater had a reputation for spurious polls, leaking medical records, 
ambiguous racial slurs and false press releases.32 These well tried techniques were used 
to full effect. Atwater later admitted that as far as the attacks were concerned, “the sky 
was the limit on Dukakis’s negatives.”33 No proof was forthcoming that Kitty Dukakis 
had burnt the American flag or that the Democratic candidate had been treated for mental 
illness but serious damage resulted.34
 
According to Richard Darman, taxes were a key wedge issue against the Democrats.35 
Paying taxes is rarely popular and any promise to cut or hold taxes receives voter 
attention. However, making such a promise is fraught with danger. In order to account for 
inflation, government revenue has to rise just for expenditure to stand still in real terms. 
Holding the line on taxes implies cuts in government expenditure or expansion of the 
national debt. Predicting future economic conditions is an uncertain science and, to adjust 
to changed circumstances, economic policy must remain flexible. In 1988, despite the 
temptation, Dole in the primaries and Dukakis in the national election both refused to 
 8
commit themselves on taxes. In order to differentiate his campaign, Bush took a risk and 
made the unequivocal pledge ‘no new taxes.’  
 
Race and crime were also important wedge issues. Alexander Lamis credits Atwater’s 
“effective use of Willie Horton” as a major factor for the “white flight into the 
Republican Party.”36 Lamis claims that Atwater was able to galvanise the trend to the 
benefit of the campaign. Moving the debate from the faltering economy to divisive social 
issues was greatly to Bush’s advantage. Once the race issue had been exploited, the 
political culture took over. After the election, Atwater was rewarded with the 
chairmanship of the Republican National Committee. James Baker, rarely given to 
hyperbole, considered that, “he [Atwater] received, and deserved, much of the credit for 
our win.”37  
 
The ruthless exploitation of wedge issues had two long term consequences for the Bush 
presidency. Firstly, it left lasting bitterness within the Democratic Party, which would 
later come back to haunt the Bush administration. Democratic intransigence during the 
1990 budget negotiations can be directly linked back to campaign tactics. Richard 
Darman acknowledged that many democratic congressmen were determined to make the 
President Bush pay for his use of ‘illegitimate’ tactics in the 1988 campaign.38  
 
Secondly, by detaching his own political identity from his tough campaign image, Bush 
called into question his own authenticity raising questions about his personal identity and 
integrity. In private a courteous and modest man, Bush tended to adopt a diffident manner 
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in public forums and had a visceral antipathy for public communication. David Mervin 
called this antipathy a major flaw and claimed that skill in communicating with the public 
was, “an essential requirement of presidential leadership.”39  Darman bluntly recorded, “I 
noted the obvious: George Bush was not Clint Eastwood.”40 The attempt to repackage 
Bush only served to reinforce suspicions that Bush, unlike Reagan, had no set of core 
political beliefs. Despite Ailes best efforts, the repositioning struck a false note. 
 
If Bush could not exude conviction, Baker was determined to give him a plan and keep 
him on message. Bush coined a new slogan “not to demagogue but deliver.”41 If delivery 
was important, a clear commitment needed to be delivered particularly if the Reagan 
mantle was to be credible.  Many conservatives, such as Newt Gingrich, regarded taxes 
as the acid test of Bush’s intentions. Peggy Noonan, a fervent Reagan loyalist, believed 
that a firm pledge on limiting taxes would symbolise continuity and resonate with Reagan 
supporters. Parmet claimed that taxes had supplanted anti-communism as a rallying point 
for the radical right who had taken control of the Republican Party.42
 
Populist Currents 
 
The growth of suburban communities and the loosening of blue collar ties to the 
Democrats had worked profound changes on the political landscape. According to Black, 
Reagan had, “significantly expanded grassroots southern Republicanism by realigning 
white conservatives and neutralising white moderates.”43  Bush’s use of influence and 
government connections was at odds with the prevailing populist undercurrent in his 
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party. Phillips makes the case that Bush’s Texas connections were superficial and that 
Bush’s politics were still firmly grounded in north eastern Ivy League conservatism.44 
Despite trumpeting his entrepreneurial skills, Bush’s Texas business ventures were 
funded by family connections using Wall Street money.45 Membership in Yale’s 
exclusive Skull and Bones and the old boy network reinforced his preppy image.46 Bush 
was the epitome of the real or imagined elite that were held in contempt by populists and 
grass-roots conservatives such as Newt Gingrich.47  
 
Demographic shifts and the growth of the Sunbelt greatly increased southern influence 
within the GOP. By 1988 congressional leadership had passed into new hands with Trent 
Lott (Mississippi) in the Senate and Dick Armey (Texas) and Newt Gingrich (Georgia) in 
the House.  Populism had a long history in Southern politics from Huey Long to Strom 
Thurmond to George Wallace. Indeed many of George Wallace’s supporters shifted over 
to Reagan.48 Presidents Johnson, Carter and Clinton had a populist aspect to their style 
and politics. Reagan was greatly admired by populist Republicans in the South who 
identified with his modest roots, self-deprecating humour and easy manner.49 Reagan’s 
western roots seemed authentic and natural. Hodgson wrote that radical conservatives 
differentiated themselves from traditional Republicans by the use of populist rhetoric and 
added that, “the very fact that conservatives began to phrase their appeal in populist 
language transformed the nature of American politics.”50  
 
Alan Brinkley argues that the radical populist tendency in the Republican Party can be 
traced back to McCarthyism. For many years, particularly in Goldwater’s time, the 
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tendency was treated by the governing consensus, including Bush, “as if it were a kind of 
pathology.”51  Leo Ribuffo argues that it was not until Reagan that the radical right was 
brought into the mainstream. Reagan was able to embody both change and continuity and 
thus unite the party52 It was Bush’s misfortune that not only did he follow Reagan but at 
the same time radical conservatives were in the process of taking over the Republican 
Party. Bush’s previous uncertain political allegiances and elitist image made his position 
vulnerable. His rhetoric on taxes was an attempt to connect with the growing populist 
constituency.  
 
Aiming for the Top Deck 
 
As Bush was not an articulate public speaker, improving presentation became an 
overriding priority. Many in the campaign team even wondered if he was up to the job.53 
By the end of July 1988, nervousness was growing in the Bush camp about the 
impression that the candidate would make at the convention. Bush recorded in his diary 
that advice was coming from all sides regarding, what to wear, how to relax, the need to 
exhibit warmth and even the importance of ‘walking tall.’54 That such advice was so 
freely given is indicative of how much doubt had crept into the campaign. Newspapers 
were speculating that if he failed in New Orleans his campaign would be all uphill.55  
 
To make up the ground lost to Dukakis, it was essential that Bush came out of the 
convention with momentum. Bush told Peggy Noonan that he wanted the acceptance 
speech not just to hit a home run but to put the ball in the top deck.56 Noonan had written 
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some of Reagan’s most memorable and emotional speeches including the one comparing 
the Contras to Washington’s ragged Continental Army and the eulogy at Omaha Beach to 
the US Rangers, “who made free a continent.” Cannon testifies that even the press 
wept.57  Peggy Noonan was a master of the conversational narrative style that perfectly 
suited Reagan.  
 
Leaving Noonan to write the speech, Bush devoted his time to presentation rather than 
content. He consciously tried to become more like Reagan but admitted found it an uphill 
battle.58 The press were patronising, one commentator likened his speaking style to, “a 
sixteen year old from Andover.”59 Craig Smith, who wrote many speeches for Bush, 
claimed that Bush resisted structuring speeches and would not rehearse. Bush had a 
tendency to wander off message as when he waffled about the “big mo” which damaged 
his candidacy in 1980.60  Peggy Noonan, always a visceral speechwriter, found it difficult 
to write for him. According to Noonan, Bush had an aversion to using the first person 
singular resulting in a terse even clipped use of language quite unsuitable for speeches.61 
The campaign team worked hard to change these low expectations. Roger Ailes 
scheduled regular sessions to improve presentation. Each session was video recorded to 
monitor progress. The goal was to loosen up speaking style, to stick to the script and to 
master voice control62 in order to craft a speech that would showcase the new forceful 
Bush. The acceptance speech would be a critical test: its drafting was entrusted to Peggy 
Noonan. 
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Noonan was uncertain about what exactly Bush wanted to say. Briefings from Bush to 
Noonan were sporadic. Conversations were snatched on planes and at campaign stops. 
When she tried to push the candidate to be more personal and reflective, Bush became 
“distracted and elliptic.”63 He was very clear that he did not want the emotional “get 
inside my head” type of writing that Gail Sheehy had penned about him in Vanity Fair.64  
Bush sent Noonan a hand written note on July 15, 1988, “giving her some thoughts to 
work with.”65 Noonan regarded the note as the key briefing document for the acceptance 
speech.66 The note was really only a list of topics. It is striking that Bush mentioned 
neither the economy, taxes or the budget deficit but only vague concepts such as peace, 
education, families, opportunities, faith. The note begins with the admonition “I’m just 
me,” but with no guidance about what ‘me’ represented. With the vagueness of the brief, 
Noonan was given a free hand. 
 
Noonan paid little attention to the many suggestions she received from colleagues about 
the content of the acceptance speech. However, one person she did listen to was Jack 
Kemp. Peggy Noonan had hoped that Jack Kemp would win in the primaries and become 
the Republican presidential nominee.67 Kemp had crossed swords with Reagan’s more 
pragmatic Budget Director David Stockman, who thought tax cutting, regardless of 
circumstances, was naive.68 According to Stockman, Jack Kemp’s supply-side views on 
taxes and government expenditure had greatly impressed Ronald Reagan.69 With 
Stockman gone and changes coming in Washington, Kemp wanted to influence the 
debate early. Kemp, the author of the Kemp-Roth Tax cut in 1981, told Peggy Noonan 
that there would be pressure to raise taxes once Bush was elected and that the acceptance 
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speech had to make clear that Bush would not budge. Kemp’s stressed to her “hit hard on 
taxes.” As a result, Noonan wrote into the speech, “The Congress will push me to raise 
taxes, and I’ll say no, and they’ll push, and I’ll say no, and they’ll push again. And I’ll 
say to them, read my lips: no new taxes.”70  The die was cast. 
 
The tax pledge was the main and, except for a vague promise about creating jobs, the 
only specific policy commitment in the acceptance speech. There was no attempt to put 
the tax promise into a wider context.  By guaranteeing low taxes, and by implication 
smaller government, Bush was sure of an enthusiastic reaction from the party faithful. 
Once the acceptance speech draft was circulated, there was debate among senior 
campaign staff about whether such a firm pledge on taxes was prudent. Richard Darman 
was against inclusion, remembering the embarrassment when Reagan had to go back on 
his word and raise taxes. Darman maintained that, given the state of the economy, such a 
sweeping commitment would be impossible to honour without major cuts in entitlement 
programmes.71 Baker, ever cautious, also had reservations. Bush was fully aware of the 
risk that was being incurred. In May 1988, he had met with Martin Feldstein, former 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and with Michael Boskin, Professor of 
Economics at Stanford. Both warned that tax increases would be necessary if the growing 
deficit was to be contained. Bush told the journalist Gerald Boyd that he did not accept 
their assessment and that the budget would have to be balanced by a freeze in spending.72
 
Supporting Bush’s uncompromising stance, Ailes and Atwater insisted that the tax pledge 
was non-negotiable. They considered it to be the cornerstone of the acceptance speech 
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and any hedging or qualifying would undermine the new tough but caring image that they 
were seeking to project. Further, they argued that Bush had been making the ‘no new 
taxes’ promise for months on the campaign trail and that it had featured prominently in 
the campaign literature.73 Up to that time, public reaction had been muted and had given 
no cause for concern. Ailes was confident that the lines on taxes would win the 
convention over and score the home run Bush was seeking.74 Darman, anxious about the 
inherent risks in making irrevocable promises, directly lobbied Peggy Noonan. She 
refused all attempts to remove or amend the lines on taxes.75  
 
Further consideration of the speech was postponed because of the Quayle crisis. When 
George Bush arrived in New Orleans, he announced that Dan Quayle was his choice as 
vice-president. Like the later decision to raise taxes in 1990, Bush did not discuss the 
vice-presidential nomination with any of his advisors. In comparison to Dole or Kemp, 
the projected front runners, Quayle was a virtual unknown with little experience on the 
national stage. It was unlikely that he would upstage Bush: a decided possibility with 
Dole or Kemp. The normally supportive Baker was angry at not being consulted and at 
the lack of background checks. The introductory press conference compounded the 
problems. Quayle denied allegations that family influence and money had enabled him to 
avoid the draft during the Vietnam War. More damaging questions surfaced alleging 
sexual liaisons and college cheating. Echoing criticism previously levelled at Bush, 
perhaps the most damaging comment was that the future vice-president was a spoiled 
lightweight.76  
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The clamour that surrounded the Quayle nomination distracted the campaign team for the 
rest of the convention. The review of the speech, sought by Darman and others, did not 
take place. Any chance there might have been to reconsider or amend the line on taxes 
was lost. While Bush was preparing to make his speech that evening, Baker, Fuller and 
Teeter were appearing on different national television channels explaining away the 
Quayle fiasco.77 The fateful lines on taxes were delivered with the exact words, tone and 
emphasis as Noonan had originally written them.  
 
On the night, Bush scored his home run. He had been able to communicate continuity and 
that the transition between administrations would be seamless. The right note had been 
struck without being specific about policy or directly attacking Dukakis. Peggy Noonan’s 
well crafted language had enabled Bush to appear tough but caring. James Baker and the 
rest of the campaign team were delighted.  Although Darman, still anxious about the tax 
issue called the speech, ‘back to the future,’ and believed that it hardly set a platform for 
effective government.78
 
Bush’s delivery was strong and measured: the time working with Ailes had been well 
spent. The convention and the press were won over. National Public Radio called it ‘the 
speech of his life’79 and there was an immediate lift in the polls.80 The marrying of caring 
to toughness was crafted into the speech through two rhetorical devices. Firstly, caring 
was referenced by “a new harmony… a thousand points of light,” which alluded to caring 
community action rather than intervention through high cost government.81 How this 
emphasis on community was going to be a practical alternative to the billions spent each 
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year on social welfare was not explained. Indeed, there was confusion in the media about 
exactly what “a thousand points of light” actually meant and the call to community action 
was either missed or completely ignored in the New York Times the next day.82
 
Secondly, toughness was communicated by, “read my lips: no new taxes.” With the lack 
of any other specific policy commitments, the tax promise received front page headlines 
in the press.83 With widespread national television coverage, the tax pledge rapidly 
entered national consciousness for the first time. The commitment was so unequivocal 
and uncompromising that it changed perceptions about Bush’s determination and 
decisiveness. In the months before the election, the tax pledge became more and more 
synonymous with a conservative agenda that included abortion, guns, the death penalty 
and school prayer. It was a linkage that would greatly compound problems later with the 
right wing of the Republican Party when the tax promise had to be broken. 
 
Economic Philosophy 
 
There is little evidence that Bush believed in economic growth through low taxes. 
Although Bush was an economics major at Yale, Krugman contends that Bush was 
neither interested in supply side ideas or took much interest in economics.84 The 
conservative commentator Fred Barnes claimed that Bush was unconcerned about the 
need to reduce marginal tax rates in order to spur saving and stimulate growth in the 
economy: key priorities of Jack Kemp and his supporters.85 Conservatives were always 
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suspicious that Bush’s comments on ‘voodoo economics’ reflected his true opinion of 
supply side policies.  
 
When Nixon was reviewing vice-presidential candidates in 1968, Eisenhower 
recommended Bush, as an ‘acceptable’ nominee with the ‘right economic views.’86 At 
this time, Bush was considered to be in the mainstream of Republican economic thinking.  
During his period in Congress, despite being a member of the Ways and Means 
Committee, Bush’s legislative and policy achievements were limited.87 The influential 
chairman Wilbur Mills did not hold Bush in high regard and subjected him to ridicule.88 
However, Bush was a staunch defender of the oil industry and particularly the oil 
depletion allowance. Bush’s main concern was the cutting of business and capital gains 
taxes. His support for oil industry tax breaks ran counter to a growing call within 
Congress for tax reform. Bush’s close contact with the oil industry and their lobbyists 
lasted right up to and during his time as president.89  
 
By and large, before taking national office, Bush supported the orthodox financial views 
of the eastern establishment.90 But he was often accused of saying things to please an 
audience.91 On one occasion, Bush made the surprising suggestion that a solution for 
unemployment was ‘unbridled free enterprise’ and claimed that agricultural cartels could 
be justified by reference to the free-market economics of Adam Smith.92 With a lower 
public profile, such straddling could be made to work but as he rose to national 
prominence greater clarity was required.  
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Presidential aspirations forced Bush to set out his stall. By the spring of 1980, Bush was 
falling behind Reagan in the race for the Republican presidential nomination. Bush tied 
economic stability to wiping out the deficit.93 In a speech at Carnegie-Mellon University 
Pittsburgh on 10 April, Bush characterised Reagan’s fiscal supply side ideas as ‘voodoo 
economics.’ The attack backfired and damaged Bush with the Republican base and he 
rapidly tried to distance himself from the statement. Conservatives were offended by the 
derisive dismissal of Reagan‘s supply side policies. Bush’s lack of frankness and 
consistency seemed to confirm the wimp image.94 After the 1980 election, Bush 
repeatedly denied having used the term ‘voodoo economics.’ He claimed that he had been 
misquoted. Two years later, during the NBC evening news, Tom Brokaw ran a clip of the 
Pittsburgh speech much to the Vice-President’s embarrassment.95 Bush’s credibility was 
once again put in doubt.  
 
As vice-president, involvement in economic policy was limited.96 Other than heading a 
deregulation task force, Bush kept a low profile and was considered overly deferential to 
Reagan.97 Stockman records that, during the intense discussions over tax cuts and the 
controversial 1981 tax package, Bush offered few opinions and his contribution was 
negligible.98 Bush always seemed more comfortable with pragmatic solutions rather than 
taking ideological positions.99 In 1988, many in the Republican Party still harboured 
doubts about the ‘voodoo economics’ speech. The tax pledge in New Orleans was an 
attempt by Bush to convince sceptics that he enthusiastically embraced supply side 
policies. 
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Managing the Deficit 
 
The Reagan tax cuts had created large budget deficits. In an attempt to address the 
problem, Reagan had agreed to limited tax increases in 1983 and 1986. The Republican 
administration of 1981-89 had left a heavy legacy of growing budget deficits. Many 
believed that the rising national debt posed a threat to long term stability.100 Ippolito 
argues that, “deficits during the 1980’s had been large by virtually any measure,”101 and 
the debt to GDP ratio had grown from 25% to 45%.102 By the end of the decade (1981-
90), the budget deficit almost tripled and the annual deficits had fluctuated around 4% of 
GDP (see Table 1). Without tax increases, the only way out of the deficit problem was for 
increased tax revenue to accrue from a rapidly growing economy. By ruling out any tax 
increases, Bush faced a budget crisis that would only get worse if the economy slowed. 
 
After election Bush had to face the reality of the economic situation. Higher deficits 
restrict economic growth by reallocating of resources from the private to the public 
sector. There is debate over the long term impact of deficits on the economy. Krugman 
argues that the net effect, during the Reagan years, was about a half of one years output 
which represented a fall in GDP of 3%.103 However, Rosenberg believes that the effect 
was more significant and holds the deficit responsible for higher real interest rates and 
transfers from the low wage earners to owners of capital; thus contributing to the 
stagnation of living standards and income inequality evident in 1980’s.104  
 
 21
The impact of budget deficits on the economy depends on economic circumstances at the 
time. When Bush came to office in 1989, US budget deficits were universally seen as a 
sign of American weakness and declining competitiveness. Today such deficits are 
regarded as crucial for maintaining world economic growth.105 Owing to recent high 
productivity, the Federal Reserve was able to pump liquidity into the US financial system 
after the dotcom bubble burst. The financing of budget deficits has been possible without 
inflationary pressures, despite the large 2001 tax cuts. In recent years, core inflation has 
been the lowest in three decades, boosting foreign investors’ confidence.106 The 
globalisation of international finance created an expanding market for US government 
securities which has directly subsidised US deficits since 2001.107 In recent months, there 
have been ominous signs that this state of affairs may be coming to an end as higher real 
interest rates and a credit crunch take hold. 
 
The situation encountered by Bush was quite different. On taking office, his 
administration was required to fund high interest rate payments for the rapidly rising 
national debt. In addition, the economy was struggling with inflationary pressures, low 
productivity and declining economic growth rates. Further, the opposition in Congress 
had a separate agenda and any budget, presented by the Bush administration, was 
contingent on Democrat agreement. With falling tax revenues and increased expenditure 
through entitlements and automatic stabilisers, the deficit appeared to be running out of 
control (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Budget Deficits and Debt Interest 1981-1992 (in billions of dollars)  
 
i) Budget ii) Deficit  iii) Debt     iv) T Bill 3 Month   
    Deficit  % GDP Interest        Rate (End Yr) % 
1981   79  -2.6      69    14   
1982  128  -4.0      85    11 
1983  208  -6.0      90      9 
1984  185  -4.8    111    10 
1985  212  -5.1    130      7 
1986  221  -5.0    136      6 
1987  150  -3.2    139      6 
1988  155  -3.1    152      7 
1989  153  -2.8    169      8 
1990  221  -3.9    184      7 
1991  269  -4.5    194      5 
1992  290  -4.7    199      3 
                                                                                                                                        . 
               
Source: i. & ii. U.S. Budget for Fiscal year 2008, Historical Tables p. 25. 
             iii.       Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President (Washington DC), p. 391. 
             iv.       Federal Reserve: US Treasury Bills (Secondary market)  
                        at <www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/data/Annual_Dec_/H15_TB_M3_txt> 
  
 
Thus the growing budget deficit posed formidable problems. The expansion of national 
debt during the 1980’s had resulted in substantial increases in net interest outlays. These 
outlays became a significant source of increased government expenditure growing at a 
much faster rate than GDP.108 Although interest rates had declined from the high levels 
of the early 1980’s (see Table 1), the decline in rates would have been greater but for the 
need to fund the budget shortfall.109 Morgan has shown that, despite the moderation of 
inflation in the 1980’s, real interest rates remained high.110 High real interest rates forced 
business to only invest in projects that had higher rates of return. Marginal projects were 
postponed depressing the overall level of investment. Savings, previously available to 
finance private sector investment, were diverted to cover the growing public debt. 
Between 1980 and 1987, national saving declined from 7.9% to 2% of national income. 
As a result, of higher interest rates and a diminished investment pool, there were less 
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investment funds available for the private sector to finance consumer credit or business 
investment.111 If the budget deficit had been lower, the pool of private investment capital 
would have risen. Bush was placed under enormous political pressure to fix the problem. 
 
Supply side theories were becoming increasingly discredited. It had been predicted that, 
by cutting the top marginal rates of tax, an investment boom and improved productivity 
of capital would result. Lower taxes would create incentives to work harder. People 
would save and invest more with their additional disposable income. Further, it was 
claimed that lower tax rates would increase people’s willingness to invest in riskier 
ventures. Rosenberg claims there was little evidence that supply side policies delivered 
the accelerating economic growth claimed by its supporters.112 Krugman has shown that 
the average annual growth rate, during the two Republican administrations, was 2.1%. 
This performance compared to 3.4% per annum in the post-war years prior to 1980. One 
has to be cautious about time periods and business cycles when considering growth 
statistics. Even taking the most favourable time period 1982-89, the growth rate barely 
exceeded the post war average.113  
 
Supply side tax policies and the reduction of top marginal rates did not result in a trickle 
down of prosperity or an increase in the funds available for investment. Rosenberg 
maintains that the Republican economic agenda led to growing income inequality, 
reversing the post war trend. Real hourly wages fell for the bottom 60% of the workforce 
while the wealthiest 5% saw real incomes rise by 2.3% annually. He also claims that 
about 40% of the increase in inequality can be directly attributed to changes in federal 
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government tax and transfer payments.114 In a time of falling real wages, employers had 
every incentive to substitute labour for capital.115 By the time Bush came to office many 
Americans were increasingly dissatisfied and angry with their falling standard of 
living.116 There was a growing consensus that tax increases would be required if the 
budget was to be balanced and living standards restored.  
 
After appointment as Budget Director, Darman wrote in a memo to Bush that he was 
concerned that, “the deficits were disproportionately financing current consumption 
rather than investment in future productive capacity.”117 Michael Boskin was also 
worried about the growing deficit and advocated fiscal austerity and tax increases.118 
Alan Greenspan joined the chorus and told the new administration that the deficit would 
need to be addressed and also insisted on a policy of austerity. The Fed tightened 
monetary policy despite risks of an economic slowdown.119 The pressure on Bush to 
change course mounted. Bush had become trapped in a one way tax policy that was 
driven by the ‘voodoo economics’ that he had mocked in 1980. It was becoming 
increasingly clear that the deteriorating economic situation could be ameliorated only by 
raising taxes and/or cutting spending. Supply side economics had not worked out as 
planned. 
 
Budget Impasse 
 
Political difficulties compounded Bush’s economic problems. Firstly, the rapid growth of 
budget deficits had become a political issue as well as an economic problem. There was 
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disquiet in the press and in Congress about the growing size of the national debt. It 
seemed to the public that the political system was incapable of controlling the deficit and 
that the hard decisions were being avoided.120 The failure to address the deficit 
undermined the legitimacy of the new Bush administration. The New York Times, 
believing that increased taxes were inevitable, called on Bush to abandon attempts to cut 
the capital gains tax, and argued that fixing the deficit should be the main priority.121 
According to Mark Rozell, the press gave Bush low marks for economic policy during 
his first year in office.122
 
Secondly, Congressional Democrats were seeking to embarrass the new administration 
after the brutal presidential election. Under the terms of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act, binding constraints had been on imposed on federal spending. In order to comply, 
the budget was required to keep the deficit under $100 billion. In view of projections, 
there was little likelihood that such a target could be met for 1990 budget. To avoid 
sequesters, Congress had to acquiesce and allow off-budget allocations in order to keep 
within the terms of the Act. Despite his friendship with the new president, Dan 
Rostenkowski, Chairman of Ways and Means, made it clear that reducing the deficit must 
be the main priority.123 Bush employed a ‘smoke and mirrors’ approach, with highly 
optimistic revenue estimates, to get the amended 1989 Reagan budget plan through 
Congress without addressing the tax issue.124 Rostenkowski’s price of cooperation was 
that increased taxes had to be part of the next year’s (1990) budget package.125
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Thirdly, shortly after Bush took office, the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis erupted. 
Deregulation had resulted in S&L capital requirements being eased and lending 
restrictions removed. Increased competition led to riskier portfolios and lower rates for 
deposits.126 When the housing market tightened, the home loans sector faced a crisis.  If 
an S&L failed, deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation and were guaranteed by the FSLIC. Ultimately, the Federal Government 
stood behind the losses. As a result of the debacle, the projected budget deficit had 
suddenly become much bigger. The pressure on Bush to raise taxes ratcheted up. 
 
Bush moved quickly and sent legislation to Congress to prop up the S&L’s. However, the 
bankruptcy of Lincoln Savings and Loan and the allegations of fraud surrounding it 
rapidly resulted in a crisis of confidence. The Lincoln debacle led to other failures. By the 
end of 1989, the cost of rescue efforts was put at $275 billion and rising127 with 750 
banks needing help. Bush came under further embarrassment when his son Neal was 
investigated as a director of a failed S&L.128  
 
The Bush administration recognised that a bailout was required. If raising taxes was not 
an option, the only other course of action was to reduce spending. But freedom to cut 
expenditure was limited by prior legislation which mandated expenditure for social 
welfare well into the future. By 1990 budget year, a total of $568 billion or 55% of total 
expenditure was already committed and ring-fenced (see Table 2).  During the sixties, a 
raft of new programmes had been instituted including Medicare and Medicaid. Over time, 
coverage was extended and benefits expanded. Under the Republican President Nixon, 
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Social Security benefits increased by 50% and benefit indexing and cost of living 
adjustments caused a surge in programme costs.129 Even Reagan had not been able to 
stop the march (see Table 2) and there was little hope that Bush would be more 
successful.  
 
Spending cuts on entitlements were in the hands of Congress. The president had no 
control over mandatory appropriations. Cutting entitlement programmes required new 
legislation from Congress. Constitutionally, all money bills have to originate in the House 
of Representatives where the approval process is long and uncertain. An added 
complication was that members of the House had to face election every two years and 
feared that a backlash from voters would be immediate if entitlement programmes were 
cut.  
 
Table 2.  Growth of Outlays for Mandatory Programs (in billions of dollars) 
 
i.) Total Outlays     ii.) Mandatory        Mandatory      Mandatory % 
    $ Billions  Programs        as % Total    5 Yr Growth  
1965       117       31   26   - 
1970       193       61   32            96  
1975       279     151   57          147 
1980       517     262   50            74 
1985       734     401   54            53  
1990     1032     568   55            41 
.                                                                                                                                             . 
               
Source: i.). Budget for Fiscal year 2007, Historical Table 1.1, Summary of Receipts, Outlays, p. 22. 
             ii.) Budget for Fiscal year 2007, Historical Table 8.5, Outlays for Mandatory Programs, p. 142.    
 
 
 
It was not just entitlement spending that was ring-fenced. During the run up to the 
election, Bush committed to continue the Reagan policy of building a strong defence. 
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This was a political imperative for Bush who needed to shore up his standing with the 
conservative base. The defence budget had grown from 22.7% to 27.3% ($290 billion) of 
total US government expenditure during the eight years of the Reagan administration. 
Reagan’s attempt to lower the cost of government had fallen on the remaining 
discretionary expenditure which constituted barely 25% of the budget. By the time Bush 
took office, there was little left to cut. 
 
Thus containing deficits through expenditure cuts was impossible while defence and 
entitlements remained sacrosanct. Reagan had left his successor very little room to 
manoeuvre. . Contrary to popular belief, taxes as a share of GNP were not lowered under 
Reagan. Indeed, Boskin has shown that tax cuts were not the only factor responsible for 
the rise in government debt in the 1980’s. The inability to keep spending under control 
also played an important role. Boskin points out that between 1981 and 1988 spending 
markedly rose relative to GDP.130 Democrats realised that the relentless growth of 
spending programmes posed a serious long term problem but their solution to the 
problem was increased taxes. Through 1989 and early 1990, Bush seemed in denial 
hoping that changed circumstances would allow postponement of the day when taxes 
would have to be raised. 
 
Darman recognised that bringing mandatory entitlements under control was essential but 
that the price for expenditure cuts “was almost certain to be a tax increase.”131 Presidents 
Carter and Ford told Bush that the only way to balance the budget was to raise taxes but 
Bush would not grasp the nettle. Both the President and James Baker were determined to 
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hold the line on taxes for at least the first year, fearing the political fallout. Bush 
annotated a staffer’s briefing memo with a tart, “to roll over on the Read My Lips 
pleadge [sic] would guarantee oblivion.”132 It was agreed that a two step approach be 
adopted. The ‘flexible freeze’ tax policy (see below) would be implemented for 1989 and 
then bi-partisan negotiations would be convened later to agree the 1990 budget.  
 
Rostenkowski liked and trusted Bush but was also seeking to enhance his own power.133 
He dominated the Ways and Means Committee and agreed to postpone discussion of tax 
raises for a year. Conservatives were delighted that taxes had not been raised in the 1989 
budget plan. In June 1989, after discussions with the White House, Rostenkowski 
announced that he would support a capital gains tax cut as part of the 1990 budget 
package. In return Rostenkowski privately expected reciprocity from the White House on 
higher income taxes to reduce the deficit and also help to protect his favoured domestic 
programmes. Richard Cohen, Rostenkowski’s biographer believes that the arch ‘wheeler 
dealer’ was ready to do a deal at that time,134 but the Bush administration held back. 
 
The delay in addressing the budget problems early in 1989 now appears to have been a 
missed opportunity. Political capital is usually highest after an election and Congress at 
its most receptive. Bush hoped that economic growth would gradually improve and that 
the ‘flexible freeze’ would create a breathing space to allow the economy tax revenues to 
pick up. Keeping taxes constant in real terms was not going to solve the problem. Realists 
pointed out that projected annual growth rates would have to double (to the order of 6% 
per annum) for increased tax revenues to wipe out the annual deficit.  
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 Throughout 1989, Rostenkowski’s influence was on the wane. He had been considerably 
weakened by the changes in House leadership after the 1988 congressional elections. 
Two top Democrats in the House of Representatives had resigned in disgrace. His friend 
Speaker Jim Wright was gone and Rostenkowski did not have an easy rapport with the 
new more cautious Speaker Foley. The new Republican leadership in the House barely 
knew Rostenkowski. George Mitchell replaced Robert Byrd as majority leader in the 
Senate and he took an aggressive partisan view on tax policy matters.135 With the support 
of his ally Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, he was 
determined to force an increase in income tax rates in the coming budget negotiations.  
 
Treasury Secretary Brady, an old friend of the President, led negotiations with Congress. 
Brady was ineffective and out of his depth.136 Relations with Congress suddenly took a 
turn for the worse. Mitchell, during meetings with Brady and Darman, believed that there 
had been an understanding that capital gains tax cuts would only be put forward, by the 
Bush administration, in the context of increases in ordinary income tax rates.137 The 
resentment was compounded when Republicans in the Senate tried to isolate Mitchell by 
bringing the capital gains tax cut proposal to a vote on the Senate floor. The attempt was 
easily defeated but in retaliation Mitchell broke off bi-partisan budget discussions for the 
rest of 1989. Bush appeared weak: either he was unable to control his own party or he 
was going back on his word. Darman, who replaced Brady as the administration point 
man on negotiations with Congress, admitted that the White House through 
mismanagement had lost control of the process. Even more worrying for the 
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administration, the initiative in their own party had passed to conservative Republicans in 
Congress.138
 
Compared to foreign affairs and security matters, Bush’s attention span and interest in 
economic policy was limited. As an orthodox innovator, he found it easier to exercise 
power abroad than face the intractable dilemmas he found at home.139 In dealing with the 
crisis in Iraq, Bush showed admirable focus, resolve and direct involvement in the 
management of foreign policy. Ambrose calls his skill, in putting the Arab states 
coalition together and getting Congress behind the war, a triumph.140 For a time, the 
success in Iraq silenced his critics. That Bush did not preside over the budget negotiations 
is puzzling. Influential congressmen and senators, particularly majority leaders, want to 
talk and deal with the president who has a unique power to broker agreement. Leaving 
Darman to handle the budget negotiations with Congress was a mistake and reduced the 
possibility of a success. 
 
Darman was abrasive and glib,141 qualities which did not endear him to Congress. By the 
spring of 1990 no budget agreement was in sight. Rostenkowski, his position weakened, 
closed ranks with majority leaders Gephardt and Mitchell. In an unprecedented move, the 
Democratic leadership threatened to draw up a budget and by-pass the White House. 
They also threatened that, without a budget deal including higher taxes, there would be 
no off-budget arrangements and the sequester provisions would be allowed take their 
course. The 1990 budget deficit was projected to breach the Gramm-Hollings-Rudman 
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Act by $160 billion.142  Without an agreement, appropriations would be cut off and 
government would shut down.  
 
Bush was forced to become directly involved in budget talks. Early in May, he convened 
a White House budget summit meeting attended by congressional leaders and followed it 
up with face to face meetings.143 The Democrats, increasingly critical of the President, 
were implacable and indicated that there could be no cuts without tax hikes. Mitchell 
played a pivotal role. Adamant that the President make the first move, he was determined 
that Bush should take the blame for the tax rises.144 Bush was uncertain and tentative on 
how to proceed. After two months of deadlock, at a meeting on 26 June with a delegation 
led by Mitchell, Bush suddenly conceded. He proposed reductions in entitlements and 
spending caps in return for tax increases. The proposal was accepted but crucially the 
expenditure cuts were unspecified. Darman and his negotiating team were dismayed that 
concessions had been made outside of a binding agreement. Next day, the New York 
Times claimed that, “Bush had crippled his party by abandoning his pledge not to raise 
taxes.”145 The breaking of the promise was touted as a defeat and a breach of trust. 
 
The wheel had turned a full circle. By raising income taxes, the President had been forced 
to move away from supply side commitments back to the more orthodox economic 
policies that he had championed in 1980. The anger among conservatives was immediate 
and their reaction ferocious. Gingrich, who had attended the negotiations, dissociated 
himself from the agreement. He subsequently led the Republican revolt that derailed the 
June agreement when it was introduced in Congress. Ed Rollins, chair of the campaign to 
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elect House Republicans, was forced to resign after putting out a memo recommending 
candidates should distance themselves from the President in the coming fall election. At 
the height of the Gulf War crisis, a resolution was tabled at the Republican National 
Committee, calling for the resignation of Richard Darman.146 Republicans were in 
disarray. 
 
Without clear direction from the top, the lines of communication between the Treasury, 
OMB and White House staff had become confused. In A World Transformed, Bush 
claimed that he relied heavily for advice and support from Darman and Sununu who kept 
him, “from being inundated or too busy on the wrong things or overwhelmed with 
details,” and surprisingly, went on to claim that he saw less papers than when he was 
vice-president.147 Bush admitted that when he wanted money for pet projects he just 
“hoped at a pinch, Darman could find the money.”148 Bush confided in his diary, “I hate 
dealing with Congress and these budget matters,” and later that spring, “I much prefer 
Foreign Affairs. I salute Sunnunu and Darman for doing it.”149 Economic policy is 
subordinate to political choices and subordinates cannot make decisions solely on the 
basis of economic management. Disengagement, from key economic decision making, 
was an abdication of presidential leadership. 
 
The administration drifted powerless to influence the budget process in Congress while 
Bush became immersed in the Gulf crisis. Gingrich overreached himself by openly 
coming out against his own administration and repudiating the negotiations. The 
Democrats seized the opportunity and forced through a budget more to their liking which 
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reduced the projected expenditure cuts and substantially increased taxes over levels 
previously agreed. The final humiliation was that, contrary to the first draft agreement, 
the top band of income tax was raised from 28 to 31%. Democrats had taken their 
revenge on ‘voodoo economics.’ The Bush administration’s credibility and economic 
policy were in tatters. Michael Dukakis, in a widely quoted press statement, summed up 
the Bush embarrassment, “I told the truth, I paid the price. Mr. Bush did not tell the truth 
and we all must pay the price.”150
 
Leadership Questions 
 
The tax pledge issue provides insight into the Bush leadership style. Bush was selective 
and focused on areas of personal expertise while delegating wide authority in matters in 
which he had little or no interest. Bush, who had a visceral dislike of electioneering, left 
Baker a free hand to run his presidential campaign. The campaign was successful but it 
left much bitterness with the Democratic majority in Congress who were bent on settling 
scores. George Stephanopoulos summed up the depth of feeling, “we forced Bush to eat 
his words on ‘read my lips,’ sweet revenge for what he had done to Dukakis two years 
earlier.”151 At the convention, with Baker distracted by the furore over the Quayle 
nomination, the reservations expressed by Darman and others were never properly 
considered. Without direction from Bush, Peggy Noonan was adamant that “staffers and 
suits” would not be allowed to “mess up her speech.”152   
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To win the nomination, Bush needed to convince conservatives that the Reagan legacy 
was safe in his hands.153 According to Skowronek, “[Bush] accepted his nomination for 
the presidency in 1988 with a belligerent pledge [author’s italics] to uphold the Reagan 
orthodoxy,” The pledge was untenable and as a consequence Bush fractured the coalition 
that he had come to power to serve.154 As a result, Bush’s ‘warrants for authority’ were 
greatly diminished. Bush was a leader at odds with his constitutional charge to be 
president in his own right.155  The politics of articulation required considerable political 
skill and leadership. But as Skowronek has pointed out, “Bush made himself a parody of 
the all too familiar dilemmas of an orthodox-innovator.”156
 
Later, when matters came to a head with Congress, it was a misjudgement for Bush to 
concede too much authority to Richard Darman. Mervin considered Bush’s lack of 
inclination or aptitude for the bully pulpit to be a fatal flaw.157 Parmet even went so far as 
to claim that, “the President had somehow been euchred by Darman,” when it came to 
budgetary matters.158 According to Neustadt’s analysis, a president should never rely on 
others to exercise power in critical matters and he should be his own intelligence officer. 
Bush, by distancing himself from the budget negotiations, squandered the power to 
persuade.159 By the time Bush became directly engaged, during summer 1990, the battle 
lines had been drawn and Mitchell had marshalled his troops.   
 
It was reckless to make a campaign commitment which placed limitations on the ability 
to govern. Before taking office, Bush was warned about the dangers of making election 
promises that could not be kept. Mandatory spending on entitlement programmes, the 
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S&L crisis and a growing budget deficit made it likely that taxes would have to be raised. 
The tax pledge which had started out as a campaign tactic became what Skowronek, 
termed, “the lynchpin of his and his party’s credibility,”160 and the centre piece of his 
administration’s economic policy. With competing economic interests, the President 
needed to set priorities for his administration. What Darman called, ‘kicking the can 
down the road’ was no substitute for making hard decisions.  
 
Bush claimed that he did show leadership in breaking the tax pledge because he put 
national interest above any personal political considerations.161 The evidence casts doubt 
on this claim. Bush’s sudden concession took Darman and the rest of the negotiating 
team completely by surprise. As a consequence, there was no strategy to manage the 
political fallout. It was a tactical mistake to agree to tax rises without any specification of 
the size and nature of future spending cuts.  Without substantial cuts in expenditure, large 
increases in tax revenue would be required. The President gave no public explanation 
about his reversal of policy and the press learned of the change in policy from the press 
room notice board. Roger Porter maintains that it was a clear failure of leadership to act 
so precipitately and not to educate the public.162 Rather than a considered decision in the 
public interest, it appears that Bush’s hand was forced when it became apparent that a 
credible budget agreement was impossible unless concessions on taxes were made.163  
 
A better case for altruism could be made if Bush had acted on raising taxes as soon as he 
entered office. Before inauguration, he was made aware by his advisors that his position 
on taxes was untenable. Negotiating a comprehensive budget agreement early in 1989 
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would have addressed the deficit problem before the recession took hold. Indeed, the cuts 
in spending that Bush eventually sought, as a counterweight to raising taxes, would have 
been easier to get through Congress. The coming congressional elections in1990 would 
have been two years, rather than four months away. Bush pursued a high risk strategy, 
hoping that accelerating economic growth would raise tax revenues and ameliorate the 
deficit problem. It was a gamble that did not succeed. 
 
The loss of credibility, which resulted from breaking the tax pledge, did particular 
damage among Republican supporters and cast doubts on Bush’s authenticity. Research 
has indicated that voters place a high value on authenticity.164 Hargrove believes that, 
“the primary criterion for the teaching of reality must be the audience’s assessment of the 
validity of the message.”165 Reneging on the tax pledge, directly raised questions about 
Bush’s authenticity.166  The tough and decisive image, portrayed in the election 
campaign, was at odds with his inaction and apparent loss of control over economic 
policy. Even the winning of the Gulf War could not redress the balance and it was the 
economy that counted in the 1992 election. Indeed, Pat Buchanan was convinced that 
raising taxes lost Bush the White House167 and claims that within Bush’s own 
Republican Party many voted for Perot or stayed at home. The failure to explain and put 
in context the breaking of the tax pledge was ruthlessly exploited by Clinton and Perot in 
the 1992 election campaign. They claimed that Bush had acted purely out of expediency 
which in turn cast doubts on his ability to manage a way out of the recession. 
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With better leadership skills, a political recovery from the budget crisis was possible. 
Bush was not the first president to have been economical with the truth. Reagan told the 
American people that his administration had not traded arms with Iran.168 Harry Truman 
admitted in private that Roosevelt lied169 but ‘the master of maneuver’ is still regarded as 
one of the greatest presidents.170 Unlike his predecessor, Bush does not appear to have 
appreciated the importance of what Hargrove termed ‘cultural stories.’ Such stories help 
to facilitate, “the primary responsibility of political leadership – to combine purpose and 
politics.”171  By viewing the tax promise as an end in itself, Bush was unable to give it 
meaning or put the change of tax policy into a wider context. With the use of cultural 
stories, political narrative can evolve and when necessary a new chapter can be added. By 
these means, Reagan was able to change tack and raise taxes while Bush was left trapped 
in his promise. Bush’s lack of interest in ideas and his perceived lack of vision haunted 
his presidency.172 Even Bush’s closest admirers recognised his problem with ‘the vision 
thing’ and his lack of eloquence.173 Nixon, alluding to Bush, wrote that, “a leader without 
vision inspires no one.”174  
 
In defence of Bush, the problems encountered were more intractable than those faced by 
his son’s administration. In 1989, Bush inherited a deficit problem that was running out 
of control coupled with inflationary pressures and a recession on the way: problems that 
were not of his own making. Bush was also faced with a hostile congress unwilling to 
compromise. The Republican Party was in a state of flux with new leaders like Gingrich 
publicly opposing the President. As an affiliated president, he had to manage splits and 
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ideological shifts within the governing consensus. Following a communicator like 
Reagan, any president would have found the task difficult.   
 
At the 1996 Republican convention in San Diego, Bush addressed the question of 
leadership. Wistfully, the former President told his party, “Leadership means keeping 
ones word. It means policy by conviction. It means never blaming others, or ducking, or 
dodging….it means being able to make a tough decision.” It is ironic that if he had 
followed his own advice on leadership, Bush may still have been occupying the White 
House in 1996 rather than being remembered as the only Republican president since 
Hoover to fail to be re-elected.175
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